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Immunity and Justice for All: Has the
Second Circuit Overextended the
Doctrine of Absolute Immunity by
Applying it to Arbitration Witnesses?
Rolon v. Henneman]
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rolon v. Henneman, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered
whether absolute immunity should apply to witnesses in an arbitration proceeding.
The common law doctrine of absolute immunity from civil liability for judges has
a long pedigree dating back to English courts.2 When the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the doctrine after Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court
cautioned against extending the doctrine beyond judges.3 Since then, however,
the doctrine has been extended to prosecutors and witnesses at public trials, and
more recently, to arbitrators and arbitral institutions.4 Whether absolute immunity
should be further extended to witnesses at an arbitration proceeding had not been
considered by U.S. courts before Rolon.5 In the instant decision, however, the
Second Circuit found that the functional similarity between a witness' testimony
in an arbitration proceeding and a witness' testimony in a regular judicial proceed-
ing was sufficient to extend absolute immunity to a witness in an arbitration pro-
ceeding.6 Unfortunately, the court was intentionally 7 vague on the minimum simi-
larities necessary to afford absolute immunity, leaving room for speculation as to
when absolute immunity applies and when it does not.
1. 517 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2008).
2. John B. Lewis & Lois J. Cole, Defamation Actions Arising from Arbitration and Related Dispute
Resolution Procedures-Preemption, Collateral Estoppel and Privilege: Why the Absolute Privilege
Should Be Expanded, 45 DEPAUL L REv 677, 686 (1996).
3. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,268 (1993).
4. Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of Mandatory and Professional
Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 484-94 (2004) (giving a history of arbitrator immunity and arbitral
organization immunity from 1880 to 2002).
5. See generally Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 336-341 (1983) (tracing the history of absolute
immunity from the initial incarnation of the act of 1871 until the extension of immunity to witnesses);
Weston, supra note 4, at 475-95 (outlining the history of absolute immunity up until immunity was
granted to arbitrators and arbitral institutions).
6. Rolon, 517 F.3d at 145-47.
7. Id. at 146 (specifically, the court said, "[w]e need not and do not opine as to the minimum safe-
guards required in order for absolute immunity to attach in other arbitral settings").
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Dennis Rolon began working as a law enforcement officer in 1989 and joined
the police force of Wallkill, New York in 1997.8 In April 2000, the town of Wall-
kill brought disciplinary charges against Rolon. 9 Rolon was suspended for five
days without pay in connection with these charges.' 0 In August 2000, Robert
Henneman, acting chief of the Wallkill Police Department, initiated additional
disciplinary proceedings against Rolon. 11  In connection with these charges,
Henneman again put Rolon on suspension without pay until the charges were
resolved.1 2 One of Rolon's fellow police officers, Ari Moskowitz, had informed
Henneman of several of the nine acts of misconduct that Henneman alleged
against Rolon. 13 In response to the April charges, Rolon filed a federal lawsuit
claiming that a number of police officials and the town supervisor had violated his
due process rights.' 4  Rolon never amended his complaint to include claims
against Moskowitz. 15 On January 23, 2001, the parties in the lawsuit reached a
settlement in which Rolon agreed to a general release of the claims arising from
the April and August disciplinary actions in exchange for $85,000, and the parties
agreed to arbitrate Rolon's entitlement to back pay.16 This agreement included a
provision that the arbitration would be conducted in accordance with the terms of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the town of Wallkill and the town's
police union, the Police Benevolent Association.
7
The arbitration hearing took place over the course of fourteen days between
January 24, 2001, and August 31, 2001.18 The August disciplinary charges were
broupht into the arbitration hearings, and both Henneman and Moskowitz testi-
fied. 9 Moskowitz did not return to the arbitration after a lunch break, and the city
refused to compel him to return. 20 As a consequence of Moskowitz's failure to
return to the proceedings, the arbitrator struck his testimony entirely.21 Further-
more, the arbitrator did not find Henneman's testimony truthful or credible and
found that Henneman's actions against Rolon were motivated by Henneman's
personal feelings toward Rolon.22 The arbitrator decided that Rolon was guilty of
three misconduct charges-amounting to two days' suspension without pay and
8. Rolon v. Henneman ("Rolon H"), 443 F. Supp. 2d 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
9. Id.
10. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d at 142.
11. Rolon I1, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
12. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d at 142.
13. Id.
14. Rolon H, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Rolon v. Henneman, 517. F.3d at 143.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. During Moskowitz's testimony, the arbitrator told him to produce his personal notebooks
from the time leading up to the August disciplinary action. Id. Moskowitz left the arbitration at a lunch
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oral counseling-and ordered that Rolon be reinstated with full back pay and ben-
efits.23
Following the arbitration decision, Rolon filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
a civil action for the deprivation of rights, in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, and he alleged that both Henneman and Moskowitz had
"caused him anguish and injury, intentionally violated his right to due process of
law, and abused their supervisory positions. ' 24 Specifically, Rolon alleged "hu-
miliation and economic loss in the form of lost overtime pay. 25 He claimed that
Moskowitz's lies to Henneman about Rolon's misconduct led to the disciplinary
charges that Henneman levied against Rolon, and that those charges caused Rolon
emotional distress.26
The district court drafted two opinions27 regarding Rolon's claims: one with
regards to the charges brought against Henneman ("Rolon /,)28 and one with re-
gard to the charges brought against Moskowitz ("Rolon IF,). 29 Henneman and
Moskowitz both moved for a judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c), claiming that Rolon's claims were either "barred by res
judicata," that Henneman and Moskowitz were "protected by qualified or absolute
immunity," or that Rolon "failed to state a cognizable claim for the denial of any
substantive due process rights." 30 The court in Rolon I said that Henneman, as a
testifying witness, had absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and thus did not need to address the other issues raised. 3' The court held that
Henneman had absolute immunity because the arbitration proceeding in which
Henneman testified was functionally equivalent to formal judicial proceedings;
because Henneman's testimony would have been protected in a formal judicial
proceeding, Henneman's testimony should be protected in the arbitration proceed-
ing. 32 Furthermore, the court noted that the law "expressly recognizes that state-
ments made during quasi-judicial proceedings, like those made during formal
judicial proceedings, are entitled to absolute immunity." 33
23. Id. Rolon was found guilty of:
(1) [failing to timely] comply with directives from Acting Chief Henneman ordering Rolon to
move his vehicle from the spot in which it was parked; (2) ... [failing to timely] respond to a
written directive from Henneman ordering Rolon to answer certain questions regarding an arrest
he made; and (3) [that Rolon] prepared a memorandum disrespectful of [his] superior,
Henneman... in which [Rolon] accuse[d] . . Henneman of carelessness and stupidity.




27. Two opinions were necessary because Moskowitz was out of the country for military service
when the court issued the first opinion regarding Henneman. Id. at 143-44.
28. See Rolon v. Henneman ("Rolon T'), 389 F. Supp. 2d 517 (2d Cir. 2005).
29. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d at 143. For information on the charges brought against Mosko-
witz, see Rolon 11, 443 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
30. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d at 143. Defendants' argument was that Rolon's claim was barred
as a result of the previous settlement reached in the prior suit that Rolon had filed in January of 2001.
Id.
31. Rolon 1, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
32. Id. at 519-20 (discussing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1983); Sykes v. James, 13
F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1988)).
33. Id. at 520 (citing Lettis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 39 F. Supp. 2d 181, 205 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
No. 1]
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In Rolon II, the court determined that: (1) because Rolon had not stated a
cognizable claim, the court could not reach the question of whether Moskowitz
was immune from liability; and (2) because the entirety of Moskowitz's testimony
was struck by the arbitrator, there was "no testimony to which immunity can at-
tach" and "no testimony on which a false testimony claim can be based."'34 The
court, instead of directly addressing the issue of immunity, considered whether
Rolon's due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had been violated based either
on a theory of malicious prosecution or a theory of fabrication of evidence.35 The
court held that Rolon's due process rights under Section 1983 had not been vi-
olated based on either theory because Rolon had not been arrested or otherwise
detained, he was not subject to real criminal prosecution, and there was no viola-
tion of his liberty 36 Thus, there had been no violation of his Fourth Amendment
due process rights.37
Rolon appealed both decisions to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.38 On
appeal, the court addressed all three issues discussed by the district court.39 As to
Rolon's claim against Moskowitz, the Second Circuit followed the district court's
lead and divided Rolon's claim into two causes of action: malicious prosecution
and fabrication of evidence.4° The court held that because there was no violation
of Rolon's Fourth Amendment rights, Rolon could not recover from Moskowitz
on the theory of malicious prosecution. 41 With regard to the fabrication of evi-
dence cause of action, the court held that because Rolon alleged only the depriva-
tion of property, and not a constitutional injury or a deprivation of liberty, he
failed to state a legally cognizable claim under Section 1983 for falsification of
evidence.42 Finally, with respect to Rolon's claim against Henneman, the court
held that because the nature of the arbitration proceeding was substantially similar
to formal judicial proceedings, and because Henneman performed the "same func-
tion" that he would have as a formal judicial witness, Henneman should be
granted absolute immunity.43
1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Absolute and Qualified Immunity from Liability Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the "Functional" Approach
Absolute immunity is not explicitly referenced in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 44 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend to remove any im-
munities that had already been well-established in 1871 when Congress enacted
34. Rolon II, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
35. Id. at 537-39.
36. Id. at 538-39.
37. Id.
38. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2008).
39. Id. at 145-49.
40. Id. at 147-48.
41. Id. at 147.
42. Id. at 148-49.
43. Id. at 146.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
[Vol. 2009
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the first iteration of Section 1983.45 Still, the Supreme Court was careful to limit
the possibility of new immunities drawn from Section 1983. Essentially, the
Court recognized two basic types of immunities: "qualified immunity" and "abso-
lute immunity. ' '46 Under the qualified immunity standard, public officials who
exercise "good faith" will be granted immunity.47 A public official exercises good
faith when her actions do not violate "clearly established statutory or constitution-
al rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 48 On the other hand, a
public official is not eligible for immunity when her acts are done with a mali-
cious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights.49 Conversely, absolute
immunity protects against any Section 1983 liability "regardless of the conduct"
and is granted to a substantially smaller class of government officials.50 The Su-
preme Court has further extended absolute immunity to include officials who
perform "special functions" that would not have been granted immunity under the
original 1871 common law rules.51  For instance, judges and prosecutors are
granted absolute immunity while in the performance of their official duties, as are
"quasi-judicial" agency officials who perform actions "essentially similar to those
of judges or prosecutors, in a setting similar to that of a court." 5  In a concurring
opinion in Imbler v. Pachtman, Justice White explained that the policy reason for
this extension is to protect the judicial process by shielding judges and prosecutors
from fear of liability.5 3 He reasoned that the judicial process would be under-
mined if those involved in judicial proceedings feared reprisal for their actions. 54
However, judicial immunity, which is a type of absolute immunity, is limited
to actions that judges take with regard to "judicial acts. 55 While a "judicial act"
is difficult to define, the Supreme Court in Forrester v. White distinguished a
judge's administrative function from his judicial function when it refused to apply
absolute immunity to a judge's actions when he fired a probation officer.5 6 This
was the first time that the Supreme Court enumerated what is known as the "func-
tional" approach, where a court looks to the function that the individual is per-
45. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993). In the 1996 amendment to Section 1983,
Congress explicitly spelled out that judicial officials would be immune from injunctive relief unless
there was a violation of a declaratory decree or if declaratory relief is unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
46. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69.
47. See Wesley Kobylak, Immunity of public officials from personal liability in civil rights actions
brought by public employees under 42 U.S.CA. § 1983, 63 A.L.R. FED. 744 (1983).
48. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268.
49. See Kobylak, supra note 47.
50. O'Neal v. Miss. Bd. of Nursing, 113 F.3d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1997). But see Burke v. Miller, 580
F.2d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 1978) (reiterating that judges can be "punished criminally for willful depriva-
tions of constitutional rights").
51. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268.
52. ONeal, 113 F.3d at 65. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871) (establishing absolute
immunity for judges); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 369, 402 (1926) (establishing absolute immunity for
prosecutors); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978) (establishing absolute immunity for
quasi-judicial officials).
53. 424 U.S. 409,439 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
54. Id.
55. Fisher, 80 U.S. at 347.
56. 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988).
No. 1]
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forming, rather than the role that the individual fulfills. 57 Thus, a judge's immuni-
ty is limited to the actions he takes with regard to his judicial function. 58
A court will likewise apply the "functional" approach in deciding whether to
extend absolute or qualified immunity to a government official. 59 Essentially,
"immunity attaches to particular official functions, not to particular offices." 6 If
the official is performing a function that is similar to one that would have been
granted immunity when Congress enacted Section 1983, then she should be
granted immunity. 61 In making the immunity determination, a court must weigh
the policy reasons for granting absolute immunity versus the unnecessary expan-
sion of the traditional scope of absolute immunity.62 In deciding whether to apply
absolute or qualified immunity, courts, in part, consider the adversarial nature of
the process in which the individual is involved (the more sirMilar in nature the
process is to a standard adversarial trial, the more functionally similar the individ-
ual's role is to one already protected by absolute immunity) and the correctability
of error on appeal (with regard to the checks on an official's power, there is less of
a need for private liability damages where an official's error is subject to ap-
peal).63
B. Extension of Absolute Immunity to Testifying Witnesses
The overriding public policy behind witness immunity is the belief that "the
paths which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unob-
structed as possible." 64 The Supreme Court outlined two reasons why private
witness immunity furthers this goal of unobstructed truth. First, a witness may be
reluctant to testify if she knows that there are potential damages associated with
her testimony; second, a witness who does testify might shade her testimony in the
hopes of avoiding future liability.65 Furthermore, fear of liability is not necessary
to keep a witness from deviating too far from the truth; the nature of the adver-
sarial system, especially cross-examination, prevents a witness from distorting
evidence beyond the bounds of reasonableness. 66 Under common law, absolute
immunity was granted to all persons considered "integral parts of the judicial
,,67process. Section 1983 did not dispose of these common law policies for main-
taining witness immunity, despite its broad text.68
57. Id. at 227.
58. Id. at 228.
59. Id. at 224.
60. ONeil, 113 F.3d at 65.
61. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268-69.
62. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224.
63. ONeal, 113 F.3d at 65 (citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 202 (1985)). Other factors
listed by the court are: the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harass-
ment or intimidation caused by potential liability; the existence of safeguards to control unconstitu-
tional conduct that already reduce private damage claims; the need to insulate an office from political
influence; and maintaining longstanding precedent. Id. No one factor is controlling. Id.
64. Briscoe v. Lafue, 460 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1983).
65. Id. at 333.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 335.
68. Id. at 334. The Court in Briscoe noted that "[elvery person" in Section 1983 "is not to be taken
literally." Id. at 330.
[Vol. 2009
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In Briscoe v. LaHue, the Supreme Court explicitly extended the absolute im-
munity of private witnesses to police officers who appear as witnesses in judicial
proceedings. 69 The Court reasoned that when a police officer appears as a wit-
ness, he is under the same requirements to tell the truth as a private witness and
should therefore be liable in all of the same ways. 70 Since a private witness enjoys
absolute immunity from Section 1983 liability, so should a testifying police offic-
er.71 Also, because a police officer can be regarded as an official who is acting as
an "integral part[] of the judicial process," he should be granted absolute immuni-
ty in the same way that any other official fulfilling such a role would be granted
absolute immunity. 72 The Court further emphasized that common law immunity
drew no such distinctions between private witnesses and government witnesses,
and it found no evidence in the legislative history of Section 1983 suggesting that
Congress wished government officials acting as witnesses to be treated any diffe-
rently than private citizens acting as witnesses.73
C. Extension of Absolute Immunity to Arbitrators
Despite early concern in U.S. courts over the judicial quality of arbitration, 74
many federal Courts of Appeals have immunized arbitrators from civil liability.75
Courts have applied the "functional" approach and found that there is enough
"functional comparability" between arbitrators and judges to warrant absolute
immunity for arbitrators; moreover, arbitrator immunity furthers the same policy
concerns for independent judgment free from intimidation and undue influence. 76
The Second Circuit has granted arbitrators "protection analogous to that tradition-
ally accorded to judges. 77 Furthermore, the Second Circuit decided that individ-
uals would not volunteer to arbitrate if they feared lawsuits stemming from their
decisions. 78 As a result, the court held that arbitrators are absolutely immune from
liability for all actions "within the scope of the arbitral process. 79
69. Id. at 335-41.
70. Id. at 335-36.
71. Id. at 336.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 336 n.15, 341.
74. See Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 239, 254-55 (1987) (claiming that judicial hostility existed with regards
to arbitration because of "quality-of-justice concerns," including: a common law lack of ability to
administer oaths, compel attendance of witnesses, compel the production of documents, or insist upon
a "discovery of facts from the parties under oath," and calling into question the arbitration's system of
fact-finding).
75. Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Wasyl, Inc. v.
First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd.,
797 F.2d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 1986); Austin Mun. Secs., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs Dealers, Inc., 757
F.2d 676, 686-91 (5th Cit. 1985); Corey v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 691 F.2d 1205, 1208-11 (6th Cir. 1982);
Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778, 780 (7th Cir. 1977); Cahn v. Int'l Ladies' Garment Union, 311 F.2d
113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962)).
76. Corey, 691 F.2d at 1211.
77. Austern, 898 F.2d at 886.
78. Id.
79. Id. But see Weston, supra note 4, at 499-501 (arguing that private individuals should not neces-
sarily be granted the same immunities and benefits as public officials just by performing tasks similar
No. 1]
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The application of immunity is clearly expanding. United States courts have
found that judges and witnesses have absolute immunity from Section 1983 liabil-
ity based on a common law history of immunity. 80 This immunity was split into
absolute and qualified immunity with regard to government officials. 81 Courts
then moved from private witness immunity to government and police witness
immunity.82 Finally, the courts have applied the absolute immunity doctrine to
arbitrators and arbitral institutions.83 Logically, the next move from absolute im-
munity of arbitrators is absolute immunity for witnesses in arbitration proceed-
ings.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Rolon v. Henneman, the Second Circuit was faced with determining the ex-
tent, if any, of witness immunity from Section 1983 liability in arbitration pro-
ceedings.84 The court first addressed Rolon's claims against Henneman and then
Rolon's claims against Moskowitz. 85 In addressing the issue of Henneman's im-
munity, the Second Circuit discussed how the U.S. Supreme Court has extended
absolute immunity to police officers when testifying in judicial proceedings. 86
The Second Circuit emphasized the policy reasons for extending absolute immuni-
ty to police officers. 87 Specifically, the court noted the concern that if police of-
ficers were held civilly liable for their testimony, they would be less likely to want
to testify as witnesses, and would be less apt to provide "candid, objective and
,88undistorted evidence." The court contrasted this concern with the possibility
that police officers and other witnesses might provide intentionally false testimony
knowing that they are absolutely immune to some forms of civil liability.89 The
Second Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court's analysis in Briscoe, however,
and found that the "functional" approach should determine when absolute immun-
ity is appropriate-that is, the functional role of an individual, rather than the
identity of the individual, should be the determining factor for when absolute im-
munity applies.
90
to public officials' tasks, and that assumptions about the necessity of encouraging arbitration are no
longer necessary).
80. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (establishing absolute immunity for judges); Briscoe
v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (extending absolute immunity to trial witnesses).
81. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224
(1988); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,506 (1978).
82. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 332-33.
83. Jones v. Brown, 6 N.W. 140, 142-43 (Iowa 1880) (the first case granting absolute immunity to
arbitrators); Austern v. Chi. Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.2d 882, 885 (2d Cir. 1990); see Olson v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers 85 F.3d 381, 383 (8th Cir. 1996) (granting absolute immunity for arbitra-
tion organizations).
84. 517 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2008).
85. Id. at 145-49. Because Rolon's claims against Moskowitz do not address the issue of witness
immunity, they will not be discussed here.
86. Id. The court cited Briscoe v. LaHue. Id. at 145. For a brief discussion of that decision, see
supra, note 5.
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The court then considered its own extension of absolute immunity to arbitra-
tors in Austern v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange, Inc.91 Applying the "func-
tional" approach, the court determined in Austern that the function of an arbitrator
was similar enough to the function of a judge to warrant absolute immunity.' The
court recognized that the policy rationale in Briscoe applies to arbitration proceed-
ings at least as much as it does to formal judicial proceedings.93 Also, the court
found that Henneman had testified in a substantially similar manner in the arbitra-
tion proceeding as he would have in a judicial proceeding, "with nearly identical
procedural safeguards." 94  Therefore, applying the Supreme Court's functional
reasoning in Briscoe and the Second Circuit's own extension of immunity to arbi-
trators, the court held that because Henneman would have been granted absolute
immunity at trial, and because he performed the same function at the arbitration
proceeding as he would have performed at trial, he should be granted absolute
immunity.95 However, the court specifically declined to establish a set of "mini-
mum safeguards" to determine when absolute immunity should apply to a wit-
ness' testimony in an arbitration proceeding. 96 Instead, the court found only that
this particular arbitration proceeding "encompassed an adequate number of safe-
guards" so that its function "sufficiently mirrored the judicial process." 97
V. COMMENT
It is difficult to predict what impact, if any, this decision will have on future
arbitrations. While not limiting the holding to the facts of this specific case, the
Second Circuit has limited witness immunity to cases where the witnesses testify
in a functionally similar manner to how they would testify in trial.98 However,
while the court listed some procedural safeguards, it specifically declined to estab-
lish which of those safeguards were necessary, how many were necessary, and
whether any other safeguards might be applicable. 99 Furthermore, there is little
discussion regarding the policy considerations behind extending absolute immuni-
ty to witnesses at arbitrations. 1°° Consequently, a number of questions remain
regarding the policy, the applicability of arbitration witness immunity, and the
limitations of arbitration witness immunity.
91. Id. (discussing Austern v. Chi. Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., 898 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1990)).
92. Id. (quoting Austern, 898 F.3d at 886).
93. Id. at 145-46.
94. Id. at 146. The court specifically listed the following safeguards: the witness "took an oath,
offered testimony, responded to questions on direct and cross-examination, and could have been prose-
cuted for perjury." Id.
95. Id. at 146-47.
96. Id. at 146.
97. Id.
98. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 146, 147 n.3 (2d Cir. 2008).
99. Id. at 146. For the list of safeguards see supra, note 74.
100. Id. at 145-46. The Court stated:
The policy rationale for witness immunity ... applies with equal or near equal force in the arbi-
tral context: [Tihe truthfinding process is better served if the witness's testimony is submitted to
the crucible of the judicial process so that the factfinder may consider it, after cross-examination,
together with the other evidence in the case to determine where the truth lies.
Id. (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333-334 (1983) (internal quotations omitted)).
No. 1]
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A. Functional Equivalence and Necessary Safeguards
The court determined that there were enough procedural safeguards present in
the Rolon arbitration to make it functionally equivalent to a regular judicial pro-
ceeding.' 0 ' While the Second Circuit did not indicate which of the safeguards it
mentioned were necessary to guarantee absolute witness immunity, it may be
possible to distill an answer to this question by reviewing the procedural safe-
guards U.S. courts have found sufficient to grant absolute immunity to testifying
witnesses.
One significant category of safeguards that courts seem to rely on is the ad-
versarial nature of the judicial proceeding.'0 2 This would encompass a number of
safeguards, including: providing the opportunity to cross-examine the witness,
having a an impartial third party determine the veracity of the witness' statements,
and providing the other side with an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence
on his behalf. The adversarial nature of a proceeding is not dispositive, however.
In certain ex parte proceedings, such as habeas corpus proceedings' 0 3 and grand
jury proceedings, ° 4 witnesses have been granted absolute immunity from civil
liability for their testimony. Furthermore, witnesses who testify by deposition or
affidavit'0 5 have also qualified for absolute immunity. Thus, a witness may still
receive absolute immunity even if the proceeding is not adversarial in character.
Another safeguard that is common for justifying absolute immunity in judi-
cial proceedings-and one that was mentioned in Rolon-is the requirement that
the witness take an oath. 0 6 The oath is a significant guarantee ensuring that crim-
inal liability, in the form of perjury, would still be available as a way to ensure
truthful testimony.'t 7  Unfortunately, there have been situations where courts
granted absolute immunity to quasi-judicial bodies that had no oath require-
ment. 0 8 Even if it is not a necessary element for absolute immunity, the oath
101. Id. at 146.
102. E.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (listing as procedural safeguards:
[t]he proceedings are adversary in nature. They are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from
political influence. A party is entitled to present his case by oral or documentary evidence
... and the transcript of testimony and exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclu-
sive record for decision. The parties are entitled to know the findings and conclusions on all of
the issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record...
Id. (internal citations omitted).
103. See Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 521 (2d Cir. 1993) (enough procedural safeguards were in
place, despite the fact that cross-examination was not available).
104. E.g., Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 1996); Anthony v. Baker, 955 F.2d 1395, 1400-
01 (10th Cir. 1992); San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., Inc., 737 F.2d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 1984);
Kincaid v. Eberle, 712 F.2d 1023, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1983); Briggs v. Goodwin, 712 F.2d 1444, 1448-
49 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
105. E.g., Cruz v. Kauai County, 279 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bums v. County of
King, 883 F.2d 819, 821-23 (9th Cir. 1989) for the proposition that "a person who functions as a wit-
ness in an adversarial proceeding... is to be accorded absolute immunity for her testimony, even if the
witness's testimony is provided by way of affidavit"); Giffin v. Summerlin, 78 F.3d 1227, 1231 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("The policy considerations underlying witness immunity for testimony in open court apply
with equal force to other forms of testimony such as depositions and affidavits").
106. Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 146 (2d Cir. 2008).
107. Id. (when discussing the procedural safeguards in place during Henneman's testimony, the court
specifically notes that Henneman "could have been prosecuted for pejury").
108. See Margaret Z. Johns, A Black Robe Is Not a Big Tent: The Improper Expansion of Absolute
Judicial Immunity to Non-Judges in Civil-Rights Cases, 59 SMU L. REV. 265, 297-313 (2006) (dis-
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requirement is still a significant factor as it helps keep the public from becoming
"powerless to deter misconduct or to punish" witnesses who give false testimo-
ny.
°9
It would seem that no single safeguard mentioned by the court in Rolon is
enough to universally grant absolute immunity. Perhaps just a number of the
procedural safeguards guaranteed by a trial are necessary. That still leaves the
problem, however, of how many safeguards are necessary. Furthermore, if proce-
dural safeguards are all just factors in a larger test, how should each of the safe-
guards be weighed? Should the ability to cross-examine the witness receive more
weight than the quasi-judicial body's oath requirement? What about a defendant's
right to notice or his ability to present evidence and witnesses on his or own be-
half? These are important questions to answer because the landscape of arbitra-
tion is largely defined by the parties and the arbitrators. Further guidance as to
what safeguards are necessary to grant immunity would allow the parties in an
arbitration proceeding to guarantee absolute immunity to any witnesses that might
have reservations about testifying.
Despite the lack of clarity on necessary minimum safeguards, by holding that
the minimum had been met, the court in Rolon has still defined at least one set of
safeguards that are sufficient to provide absolute immunity. That is, if an arbitra-
tor or parties involved in an arbitration would like to guarantee absolute immunity
to witnesses' testimonies, they can do so by instituting the same safeguards that
the court found sufficient in Rolon. As a practical matter, the court has provided a
viable set of safeguards without ever defining the necessary minimum safeguards.
B. Policy Rationale as an Alternative to Minimum Safeguards
In future decisions that deal with arbitral immunity for witnesses, courts can
at least look to the safeguards described in Rolon. Alternatively, courts could
eschew the analysis of procedural safeguards and instead consider whether the
policy rationales behind witness immunity exist in the instant case. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals utilized this approach in Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg &
Reis Co., L.P.A and determined that if one of Briscoe's two rationales for granting
absolute immunity did not apply, immunity should not be extended." ° Thus,
immunity is only necessary where the witness would be reluctant to come forward
without that immunity or if his testimony would be distorted by the fear of subse-
quent liability. In Rolon, the application of this rationale would suggest that
Henneman should be granted immunity. Under the Sixth Circuit's policy reasons
for granting absolute immunity to testifying witnesses, the reluctance of witnesses
to testify in future arbitration proceedings would alone justify extending absolute
witness immunity in an arbitration proceeding, regardless of whether the mini-
mum procedural safeguards had been met. Arguably, if Henneman had been held
civilly liable for his testimony, future witnesses may be reluctant to come forward
to testify. Furthermore, it does not matter whether Henneman's testimony would
cussing cases where absolute immunity was granted to witnesses and quasi-judicial organizations
where no oath was required).
109. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
110. Todd, 434 F.3d 432, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2005).
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have been distorted by the fear of subsequent liability because just meeting one of
the two rationales is enough under the Sixth Circuit's analysis. Still, the applica-
tion of this policy standard is not as broad as it may initially sound. For example,
in Todd, the Sixth Circuit held that a debt-collection agency's financial interests
outweighed any fear or reluctance that the agency might have had about coming
forward to testify."1
Even without specific guidance as to the minimum safeguards necessary to
guarantee witness immunity, application of the Sixth Circuit's policy considera-
tions can justify extending absolute immunity to witnesses in certain arbitration
proceedings. Potential arbitration disputants should be aware of both the Second
Circuit's minimum safeguard's rationale and the Sixth Circuit's public policy
rationale and, in the event that a disputant wants to assert immunity for his wit-
nesses, he should appeal to the rationale that is most applicable. Arbitration dis-
putants who do not want witnesses to be granted immunity for their testimony
may find it difficult to avoid in light of the continual expansion of the absolute
immunity doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to say what exactly the long-term effects will be of extending
witness immunity. The applicability of the holding in Rolon, that given the proper
safeguards, arbitration witnesses should be given absolute immunity, appears to be
very limited and may have little to no effect in certain areas of arbitration, such as
commercial arbitration. That being said, the door to witness immunity in arbitra-
tion proceedings has now been opened. At the very least, one hopes that the next
court which confronts this issue will give more guidance as to exactly when wit-
ness immunity applies and when it does not.
W. MONROE BONNHEIM
111. Id. at 443.
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